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BURYING OUR MISTAKES 
JENNIFER MERRIGAN AND JOSEPH PERKOVICH* 
PROLOGUE 
Tuesday, January 31, 2017, at 5:45 p.m. CST: Thirty-six-year-old Mark 
Christeson sits in a suicide watch cell, at the Eastern Diagnostic, Reception and 
Correctional Center in Bonne Terre, Missouri. He is due to die in little more than 
hour. He sits on the telephone with his attorneys, who just learned from the 
Supreme Court clerk that his last appeal had been denied. Before the prison cuts 
off the call—without notice—Mark’s counsel try to explain that all of his 
appeals are finished, and thus he will soon die. Mark does not understand the 
machinations his lawyers are attempting to explain. But he is worried about how 
his execution will affect others—his family and his lawyers. He wants his 
family, especially his brother Billy, sister-in-law, Kathy, and their three children, 
to know how much he loves them. And he is confused; he cannot understand 
why there is no way to appeal from the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial or why the 
governor will not change his mind after already denying clemency. His lawyers 
are perplexed too. In the two years leading up to this moment, the state and 
federal courts in Missouri had jettisoned all but a veneer of judicial process, 
preempting any meaningful review of numerous Constitutional violations. What 
transpired in that span, and during the preceding decades of his case, made sense 
really to no one on that final call, but for vastly different reasons.  
 
* Jennifer Merrigan and Joseph Perkovich are principal attorneys of the Phillips Black, Inc., a 
nonprofit, public interest law practice, and are adjunct assistant professors of both the Saint Louis 
University and Washington University law schools. This essay is a case study of the capital case of 
Mr. Christeson, whom Missouri executed at the tail end of a wave of twenty executions that 
occurred between November 2013 and January 2017. This account is from an interested party, 
counsel for Mr. Christeson during his final years. The authors acted as Mr. Christeson’s pro bono 
counsel during 2014 and, in 2015, were appointed to represent him, along with associate attorney 
Kristin Swain, which they did until his execution in 2017. This submission aspires to set forth the 
basic contours of the case, shedding light on the actual operation of Missouri’s state and federal 
courts in relation to the condemnation of a native son. See Rushing To Execution – Ethical Issues 
and Procedural Barriers in Christeson v. Roper, ABA DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW 
PROJECT, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_ 
project/events_meetings.html [https://perma.cc/QSS4-S62B]. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The crime in this case was tragic and incomprehensible. The unspeakable 
events of that winter day in 1998 remain uncertain, enveloped in confusion. The 
loss of three lives, a mother and her two children, and the enduring grief, trauma, 
injustice, and pain for those who loved them cannot be measured. On display in 
this case is the inability of a human endeavor such as the justice system to deliver 
succor for those forced to survive this kind of horror. For those consigned to 
surviving an inconceivable human loss, our public institutions are wanting. This 
reality is only exacerbated in this instance because the actual facts of how this 
crime transpired, let alone its impetus, are likely to forever remain uncertain and 
made even more so by the judicial system. As outlined below, the legal 
proceedings for this case lacked the basic adversarial testing and due process 
that our system, under law’s promise, requires. 
The death penalty, under our constitutional law, does not operate to 
condemn people merely based on the aspects of the crime itself. Instead, our 
Constitution requires the sentencer to consider the “compassionate or mitigating 
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.”1 At the core of these 
decisions is the fundamental principle that our system reserves the death penalty 
for the worst of the worst, those rare individuals who are underserving of 
mercy.2 
It is well established that even a “fatalistic and uncooperative” client “does 
not obviate the need for defense counsel” to conduct mitigation investigation.3 
Mark Christeson was far from uncooperative; as his final attorneys had learned, 
beginning from the first meeting with him in May 2014, Mark desperately 
wanted the assistance of counsel and had languished in prison for nearly a 
decade without any entity or individual—neither the federal courts nor court-
appointed counsel—considering his most rudimentary rights. What is more, he 
desperately needed counsel, because of his profound personal deficits that 
foreclosed any ability to protect his legal interests within the context of federal 
habeas corpus procedure. Mark’s deficits emerged—rather, his final counsel 
began to uncover the broad outlines of his disability, cognitive impairments, 
 
 1. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545 
U.S. 374, 377, 393 (2005) (holding that a capital defendant’s lawyer is bound to make reasonable 
efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as 
evidence of aggravation at the trial’s sentencing phase); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536–38 
(2003) (explaining that had the jury been confronted with evidence, there was reasonable 
probability that it would have returned with different sentence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
398 (2000) (finding defendant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective 
assistance of counsel when his attorneys failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating 
evidence during sentencing phase of capital murder trial). 
 2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005). 
 3. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (per curiam). 
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brain injuries, and extraordinary trauma and related ailments—during what 
would become the final thirty-two months of his life.  
In October 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed Mr. Christeson’s execution 
minutes before Missouri was set to carry it out and, in January 2015, the high 
Court summarily reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, leading to its 
remand to the Western District of Missouri for further proceedings.4 In the 
aftermath of these dramatic and rare events, the lower federal courts’ disdainful 
deprivation of expert services for Mr. Christeson constructively denied his right 
to representation under the federal statute that the Supreme Court had enforced 
in his very case, under 18 U.S.C. § 3599.5 The Supreme Court had overturned 
the Eighth Circuit by a vote of seven to two in order to permit conflict-free 
counsel to adduce evidence of Mark’s “severe cognitive disabilities,” yet his 
final counsel were systematically denied the use of the experts necessary to take 
information from the records and from the scores of witnesses who had observed 
Mark—vitally, multi-generational factors of his life, from infancy to 
adolescence and through the second half of his life, which he spent at the Potosi 
Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri. 
I.  BACKGROUND6 
Many aspects of Mark’s life demanded mercy. He was born into a family 
with a multi-generational history of pervasive incest and pedophilia. Sixteen of 
the men in his family, spanning generations, committed sex crimes against 
children. Many of Mark’s relatives had been civilly committed, arrested, 
diagnosed, or forced to register due to sexual offenses against children. 
Eventually, however, each victimizer was allowed to return to the family. 
Records reflect that Mark’s own “father,” 7 William, complained in mandated 
counseling, imposed after being diagnosed and criminally charged as a 
pedophile, that he much preferred to sleep with Mark, his one-year-old son, then 
 
 4. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 896 (2015). 
 5. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2012) (providing expert testimony upon a finding that investigative, 
expert, or other services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant). 
 6. In the course of Mr. Christeson’s representation subsequent to the Supreme Court’s 
remand, his counsel conducted scores of witness interviews and extensive, multigenerational 
records collection. This amassed evidence of severe predation upon Mark, as a child, was only 
exacerbated upon his entry, as a teenager, to the Potosi Correctional Center in Mineral Point, 
Missouri—the home of Missouri’s death sentenced prisoners—where he was preyed upon, 
mercilessly sexually exploited, and traded among powerful prisoners. The following section is 
based on these witness interviews and records collection. See generally Rule 60(b)6) Motion to 
Reopen Final Judgment Dismissing Habeas Corpus Application as Untimely at 27–41, Christeson 
v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2015), ECF No. 125. 
 7. Mark loved his father, William, who was perhaps the closest thing to a caretaker he ever 
experienced in his childhood. William was married to Mark’s mother, Linda. Mark, however, was 
conceived from a liaison between Linda and William’s brother, John. Thus, biologically, the man 
Mark knew as his father was his uncle, and one of Mark’s uncles was actually his biological father. 
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his wife. Despite the exploitation Mark suffered from William, Mark understood 
his father to be the most reliable caretaker and source of affection in the 
vulnerable and marginal childhood he spent mainly in rural Missouri, interrupted 
by temporary migrations to the California desert for seasonal agricultural work. 
Mark’s mother suffered her entire life from severe mental health problems, 
including schizophrenia and intellectual disability, and also sexually preyed 
upon her young son. During Mark’s infancy and early childhood, family 
members repeatedly caught his mother putting his penis in her mouth.  
After the death of his father when Mark was twelve years old, an adult 
cousin took custody of Mark after his mother acquiesced to her poor mental 
health and to the cousin’s perennial desire to take charge of the children 
throughout the family. The state of Missouri’s family services department 
endorsed the arrangement. Thus, Mark spent his adolescence with his extended 
family, or clan, living on an unincorporated piece of land in southern Missouri, 
where the state’s eyes were not prying. 
Subsisting in Saint James, Missouri from gasoline-powered generators 
supplying electricity to old school buses and shacks, Mark and the other children 
in his family were simply passed around from pedophile to pedophile, exposed 
from a very early age to extreme sexual violence by their caretakers, who also 
gamed the family services system for compensation from, in effect, exploiting 
these children. During Mark’s adolescent years, his replacement caretaker, his 
adult cousin whom he and other children called “Uncle,” spent his nights in 
Mark’s bed instead of the one he nominally shared with his wife. 
The unremitting sexual trauma at the hands of those responsible for his 
welfare and protection had tragic consequences for Mark’s psychological 
constitution. Society is becoming more aware of the grave effects sexual trauma 
has for such victims. Even a single event of this kind has lasting, profound 
consequences. The consequences of nightly depredations of the kind visited 
upon Mark, with the imprimatur of society as he could conceive of it in his 
isolated circumstances and limited mental capacity, are incalculable as a clinical 
matter. As a matter of empathy, the personal effects of such ceaseless violation 
are unfathomable.8 
 
 8. See, e.g., MIC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS: THE NEGLECTED VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 45–
47 (Lexington Books 1990); TONI C. JOHNSON & ELIANA GIL, SEXUALIZED CHILDREN: 
ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUALIZED CHILDREN AND CHILDREN WHO MOLEST 92 
(1993); Christine Heim et al., Pituitary-adrenal and autonomic responses to stress in women after 
sexual and physical abuse in childhood, 284 J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 592, 592–96 (2000); A.B. 
Rowan & D.W. Foy, Post-traumatic stress disorder in child sexual abuse survivors (1993): A 
literature review, 6 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 3, 3–20 (1993); George W. Woods & David Freedman, 
Symptom presentation and functioning in neurodevelopmental disorders: Intellectual disability and 
exposure to trauma, 1 ETHICS, MED. & PUB. HEALTH 348, 352 (2015); Mary Sykes Wylie, The 
Long Shadow of Trauma, 34 PSYCHOTHERAPY NETWORKER 20, 23–24 (2010). See generally 
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Mark Christeson was eighteen years old and trying to escape this physical, 
sexual victimization when he was arrested with his sixteen-year-old cousin, 
Jessie, in 1998. The two had fled to California, to the town where they spent 
periods of their childhood, stretches that were, by comparison, humane and, 
while outside the margins of society, less exploitive than the circumstances they 
endured during the bulk of their existences in Missouri. In Blythe, California, a 
small town in the Colorado Desert, law enforcement located them easily. Less 
than a year earlier, Mark had run away to this same place. The two had simply 
returned to the only other home they had known. 
Both boys were cognitively impaired. Mark was a special education student 
with a substandard IQ of seventy-four. He suffered from absence seizures that 
caused him to fade out and then return to consciousness without even realizing 
he had ever lost it.9 His limited capacity left him easily exploited and unable to 
navigate the brutal sexual violence of his home life, not that any child could hope 
to escape that isolation and exploitation from his caretakers. 
Mark and Jessie had fled Missouri to California with no money and no plan. 
They managed to find the one person who had been purely kind to them, a bait 
and tackle shop owner in Blythe who had allowed Mark’s mentally ill and 
impaired, homeless mother buy food and supplies on credit when Mark was a 
young child. During Mark and Jessie’s final flight from Missouri, the two slept 
in a truck in an open field next to the shop. They were sitting ducks when the 
police came to arrest them.  
II.  TRIAL 
Mark’s lawyers at trial presented none of the evidence of his horrific 
upbringing or severe limitations and impairments. Mark’s public defenders 
knew essentially nothing about their client and did not spend time with him or 
his family in order to understand how an eighteen-year-old kid—with neither a 
criminal history nor a history of violence—could be involved in such a severe 
crime. In many ways, trial counsel took their cues from Mark’s guardian, his 
adult cousin. During those years immediately leading up to Mark and Jessie’s 
flight from Missouri, Mark’s cousin had preyed upon Mark relentlessly, just as 
he had sexually victimized other vulnerable children within this extended 
family. He was eager to keep the family’s secrets hidden from defense counsel. 
Mark’s trial counsel posed little threat of exposing them.  
 
BESSEL VAN DER KOLK, THE BODY KEEPS THE SCORE: BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE 
HEALING OF TRAUMA 7-89 (2014). 
 9. See, e.g., Andres M. Kanner, Recognition of the Various Expressions of Anxiety, 
Psychosis, and Aggression in Epilepsy, 45 EPILEPSIA 22, 22–24 (2004); Michael Trimble & 
Anthony Freeman, An Investigation of Religiosity and the Gastaut-Geschwindsyndrome in Patients 
with Temporal Lobe Epilepsy, 9 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 407, 411 (2006); Adam Zeman, Tales from 
the Temporal Lobes, 352 N. ENGL. J. MED. 119, 119–21 (2005). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
830 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:825 
The unprepared and under resourced defense attorneys were no match for 
the special prosecutors brought in to secure a death sentence. After a change of 
venue due to pre-trial publicity, Mark Christeson was tried in Vernon County, 
Missouri. But local prosecutors did not carry out this capital prosecution. 
Instead, the case was handled by a special unit of attorneys dedicated to traveling 
throughout the state to step in for local prosecutors in county courthouses in 
order to conduct capital cases. Under the lead of Attorney General Jeremiah 
“Jay” Nixon, Robert Ahsens, one of the most infamous assistants in the unit, 
prosecuted Mr. Christeson’s case.10 The unit had a well-established pattern and 
practice of gravely unethical and unconstitutional tactics. Many of these 
instances resulted in several wrongful murder convictions and resultant 
exonerations.11 After Mr. Christeson’s trial, he had a perfunctory appeal to the 
Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment.12 
III.  STATE POST-CONVICTION 
In 2001, Mark’s case returned to his trial court,13 where new public 
defenders were tasked with challenging additional constitutional violations in 
 
 10. Kenny Hulshof led this division for years before being elected to Congress, securing the 
Republican nomination for Governor in 2008, and then losing to the Democratic incumbent and his 
former boss, Jay Nixon. See Alan Zagier, Who killed Cathy Robertson?, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. 
(Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.columbiatribune.com/72ab0a1e-ef00-52c8-bc68-ffa6234d2357.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y8DN-3RUN]. During that campaign, journalists uncovered Mr. Hulshof’s 
unethical indictment and prosecution of a teenager for murder in Chillicothe. Id. In Mark 
Woodworth’s case, the circuit judge in his county wrote Mr. Hulshof directly to solicit his unit 
taking over the murder case for the local prosecuting attorney in order to charge Mr. Woodworth 
at the judge’s urging and despite the county attorney’s determination that there was no basis to 
indict the teenager. Id. 
 11. Joshua Kezer spent sixteen years in prison before he was exonerated in 2009. In granting 
his writ of habeas corpus and ordering his release, the Cole County circuit court found that “the 
prosecutors repeatedly misstated the evidence” to the jury and hid exculpatory evidence. Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment at 2–3, 19, 31–33, 44, Kezer v. Dormire, No. 08AC-
CC00293 (Cole Cty., Feb. 17, 2009) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Dale Helmig 
was exonerated in 2010 and released from prison after serving seventeen years, when a DeKalb 
county court judge ruled that the prosecutors knowingly presented false testimony to the jury and 
then used it to make “highly improper” arguments as to the defendant’s guilt. Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law at 55, 79–80, 85, 87–89, Helmig v. Denny, No. 09DK-CC00110 (Dekalb Cty., 
Nov. 3, 2010). Richard Clay’s death sentence and conviction were vacated in 2001 by a federal 
district court because the prosecution lied to the jury about the existence of a plea deal with a state’s 
witness. Clay v. Bowersox, 367 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2004). 
 12. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 273 (Mo. banc 2001). 
 13. See Christeson v. State, 131 S.W.3d 796, 799–802 (Mo. banc 2004). Missouri’s 
mechanism for state post-conviction review from an unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful 
conviction and sentence requires a petitioner to “seek relief in the sentencing court for the claims 
enumerated.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15. 
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his case.14 The resulting perfunctory performance by these state post-conviction 
attorneys caused more harm to Mark’s legal position. Many of Mark’s family 
witnesses met the state post-conviction lawyers for the first time when they 
appeared, under subpoena, to testify at depositions at a Ramada Inn, testimony 
that typically took about ten or fifteen minutes from start to finish. Tragically, 
many of these family members held indispensable information for Mark’s case 
at that point, information that would come to light from investigation conducted 
years later. But his lawyers from the state defender system, in effect, buried this 
information by serially lurching into the depositions without prior investigation 
or even discussions with the witnesses. At bottom, post-conviction counsel 
failed to expose the rampant incest and sexual abuse that Mark was subjected to 
and observed for his entire life (and which the attorney could have discovered 
had he only conducted a courthouse search).15 Naturally, the family members 
did not volunteer information about the sadistic, often shameful, family history 
or Mark’s own brutal upbringing.  
Meaningful investigation and preparation of witnesses would have yielded 
considerable evidence of Mark’s life history and acute intellectual, cognitive, 
and psychological limitations. By failing to engage the witnesses in a manner 
adhering to professional norms, the lawyers forfeited the evidence for all future 
appeals. Even worse, the Missouri public defenders superficially engaged 
witnesses just enough to provide a veneer of performance. Due to the ever-more 
onerous procedural barriers erected in the federal habeas corpus and state post-
conviction schemes, this veneer resulted in procedurally sealing off the 
underlying substance, the actual evidence, from presentation and weighing by 
any court.16 The basic legal consequences of this facade was the vitiation, 
 
 14. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 governs motions to vacate felony convictions post-
trial. It requires that such motions “include every claim known to the movant for vacating, setting 
aside, or correcting the judgment or sentence. The movant shall declare in the motion that the 
movant has listed all claims for relief known to the movant and acknowledging the movant’s 
understanding that the movant waives any claim for relief known to the movant that is not listed in 
the motion.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(c). Mr. Christeson’s counsel facially raised multiple 
meritorious constitutional challenges, many of which would be thereby exhausted and thus 
available for presentation in a federal habeas application considered under the deferential review 
standard applicable under the 1996 amendments to the process. See infra note 16. 
 15. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (finding counsel ineffective for 
failing to examine the defendant’s prior conviction file despite knowing that the prosecution 
planned to use the prior conviction to prove an aggravating circumstance). 
 16. Since enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
(“AEDPA”), the complexity of federal habeas corpus procedure has dramatically increased—and 
to the profound detriment of the habeas petitioner. The Supreme Court’s so-called “fair-minded 
jurist” rule announced in Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), to govern review of state 
court constitutional determinations is such that, “if the ‘fair-minded jurist’ rule were taken literally, 
it would mean that a federal court could never grant habeas relief.” Stephen A. Reinhardt, The 
Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing 
Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly 
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largely, of constitutional review by the Missouri courts and, prospectively, the 
federal courts, as discussed below. In the end, no judge ever addressed the grave 
constitutional deficiencies in Mark’s case,17 especially concerning the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against executing the intellectually disabled and the 
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in developing and 
presenting mitigation evidence.18 
In fact, the “judge” who evaluated the meager claims litigated in Mark’s 
post-conviction motion was not actually a “judge” at the time of his review. 
When Mark’s state post-conviction proceedings began, his trial judge had been 
voted off the bench.19 Yet, in an extraordinary determination, the Missouri 
Supreme Court ordered the former judge to preside over Mark’s post-conviction 
litigation.20 At the end of the proceedings, the former judge signed the State’s 
lengthy proposed order without changing even a single punctuation mark or 
word. The only indication that he even looked at the document was that he 
signed and filled in the date, April 23, 2003, on the only lines the State had left 
for him to complete. The Missouri Supreme Court then affirmed this denial of 
relief.21 
Five years had passed since Mark’s arrest and significant changes to our 
death penalty jurisprudence had transpired. In June 2002, the U.S. Supreme 
Court, in Atkins v. Virginia, ruled it unconstitutional to execute the intellectually 
disabled.22 The reverberations of that case were significant, particularly in 
Missouri. First, while Atkins was still pending, the state supreme court stayed 
the execution of Christopher Simmons due to the potential impact of Atkins on 
juvenile capital defendants. Once Atkins was decided, the Missouri Supreme 
Court vacated Mr. Simmons’s death sentence—which it had previously upheld 
for decades—ruling that pursuant to Atkins it was unconstitutional to execute 
 
Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1229 (2015) (emphasis in original). Richter 
states: “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show 
that the state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood 
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. at 
1228 (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87) (emphases in original). 
 17. Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion to Reopen Final Judgment Dismissing Habeas Corpus 
Application as Untimely, Christeson v. Roper, No. 04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 9, 2016), 
ECF 150. 
 18. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (concluding that capital punishment 
of a mentally retarded individual constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 377, 393 (2005) (finding 
ineffective assistance of counsel in capital case where the defense did not request a file which would 
have shown that defendant’s mental health and childhood presented mitigating factors for the 
penalty phase of his trial). 
 19. Christeson v. State, 131 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Mo. banc 2004). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 802. 
 22. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
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minors.23 In so finding, the court thus held that Atkins had effectively overruled 
Stanford v. Kentucky, which had previously established that it was constitutional 
to execute juveniles.24 Later, Simmons v. Roper was upheld by the Supreme 
Court.25 In addition to these landmark decisions, in the time between Mr. 
Christeson’s arrest and state post-conviction proceedings, the Supreme Court 
had issued several key opinions recognizing that it was unconstitutional for 
lawyers to fail to develop available mitigation evidence.26  
All of these decisions should have helped Mark Christeson. Yet, his state 
public defenders failed utterly to litigate any of these critical changes in the law. 
Federal court should have been the place for Mark to finally secure meaningful 
review of the profound constitutional questions in his case. Mark’s federal 
lawyers had an important and legally weighty story to tell, but they discarded 
his case before ever starting it.  
IV.  FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS 
In the spring of 2004, Mr. Christeson’s state post-conviction attorney from 
the Missouri Public Defender System contacted two private attorneys in the St. 
Louis area to determine their willingness to accept appointment under the 
Criminal Justice Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3599, for Mr. Christeson’s federal 
habeas case.27 They agreed and Mark’s state public defender drafted a nominal 
pro se motion for their consideration,28 which he then had notarized in his office 
and filed for Mr. Christeson in the district court on May 14, 2004.29 This was 
just three days after the denial of rehearing and the resumption of the one-year 
statute of limitations of which only thirty-one days had elapsed between the 
finality of the judgment on direct review and the initiation of the state collateral 
review proceedings under Mo. Rule 29.15.30 On July 2, 2004, the district court 
provisionally granted the appointment motion, making it contingent upon the 
attorneys’ establishment of their qualifications and the court’s approval of a 
budget.31 After each attorney entered his appearance, they filed the requisite 
 
 23. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. banc 2003) aff’d sub nom., 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 24. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
 25. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005). 
 26. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537–38 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 
398–99 (2000). 
 27. Transcript of Hearing at 8, 47, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730, (8th Cir. Jan. 23, 
2017). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3599. 
 28. Transcript of Hearing at 47–49, Christeson, No. 16–2730, (8th Cir. Jan. 23, 2017). 
 29. Motion to Appoint Counsel, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. 
May 14, 2004), ECF 3. 
 30. Christeson v. State, 131 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Mo. banc 2004). 
 31. Order Provisionally Granting Motion to Appoint Counsel at 1, Christeson v. Roper, No. 
4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. May 14, 2004), ECF No. 5. 
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budget on July 28, 2004.32 Then the attorneys waited for the court to approve 
their budget and thereby complete their appointment. Between July and October, 
Mark’s state public defender wrote him several times that the federal lawyers 
had contacted the judge’s clerk and were waiting for the court to approve the 
budget so they “can then begin work on your case.”33  
The lawyers themselves had no contact of any kind—not a letter, a call, nor 
a visit—with Mr. Christeson until May 27, 2005,34 over a year after they moved 
for appointment and, it would emerge, over six weeks after their deadline for 
his habeas corpus petition on April 10, 2005.35 They did not file a motion to 
renew the budget, or anything else for that matter, until August 5, 2005—one 
year and ninety days after they moved for appointment—when they filed a 
hastily prepared fifty-two page habeas petition, which was largely cut and pasted 
from his state court petition.36 That petition was filed four months after the one-
year statute of limitations had expired. It was woefully late.  
When the State challenged their pleadings for being very late, the attorneys 
defended themselves and offered highly convoluted and plainly incorrect 
explanations of a calculation of the limitations period that it appears, in fact, they 
had not actually calculated at the time.37 Throughout this litigation over their 
blown deadline and in the ensuing years, they had next to nothing to do with 
Mark. After the courts ruled definitively that the filing had been very late and 
the case was dismissed without any review of the merits, the attorneys failed 
even to explain this dire situation to Mark. He had no understanding at all about 
his predicament for many years.  
Had the lawyers admitted that they abandoned their client, as the record so 
clearly demonstrates, Mark could have had a chance at federal review. Instead, 
they repeatedly argued in defense of their own mistake. In April 2014, these 
lawyers, perhaps to clear their conscious, sought expert advice and contacted 
consulting counsel. They sought an assessment of what might be done at this 
very late date, in the midst of monthly executions in Missouri. Specifically, the 
Missouri Supreme Court had issued an order to show cause why the court should 
not set an execution date for Mr. Christeson.38 By that point, the Supreme Court 
 
 32. Order Provisionally Granting Motion to Appoint Counsel at 1–3, Christeson, No. 4:04–
cv–08004–DW. 
 33. Transcript of Hearing at 63, 65, 84, 135–36, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. 
Jan. 23, 2017). 
 34. Transcript of Hearing at 80, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Jan. 23, 2017). 
 35. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 892 (2015). 
 36. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 52, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW 
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2007), ECF 10. 
 37. Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside Judgment at 4, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2007), ECF 54. 
 38. Order for Parties to File Written Notice at 1, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–
DW (W.D. Mo. May 27, 2014), ECF 63 (ordering each party to promptly file a notice with the 
court if an execution date was set for Mr. Christeson). 
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of Missouri had entered execution dates for six men whom, in turn, the State of 
Missouri executed between November 2013 and March 2014.39 
The appointed attorneys requested that counsel meet Mr. Christeson at the 
Potosi Correctional Center and then sit down with them in their office in 
suburban St. Louis to discuss what might be done to litigate equitable tolling of 
the federal statute of limitations, the deadline they had missed in 2005. When 
new counsel arrived at the prison to meet with Mark, two things were 
immediately clear. First, he had absolutely no idea that his case had been 
dismissed seven years prior. His simple understanding was that his case was still 
in court, that his “appeals” were ongoing.40 Second, he suffered from cognitive 
impairments. Judging from the initial budget filing by his appointed attorneys, 
the second observation was not a surprise. The federal lawyers initially had 
requested $4,000 in their budget for a neuropsychological evaluation.41 Yet, 
 
 39. On July 1, 2013, the Honorable Mary Russell was sworn in as Chief Justice. Marshall 
Griffin, Mary Russell To Become Chief Justice Of Mo. Supreme Court Next Week, ST. LOUIS PUB. 
RADIO, June 26, 2013, http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/mary-russell-become-chief-justice-mo-
supreme-court-next-week#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/U8FP-JD5G]. That day, the State renewed 
motions to set execution dates for Joseph Franklin and Allen Nicklasson in implicit defiance of a 
Missouri Supreme Court order entered August 14, 2012 concerning four pending motions by the 
State to obtain execution dates. Renewed Motion to Set Execution Date, State v. Nicklasson, No. 
SC79163 (Mo. banc. July 1, 2013). In that August 14, 2012 order, the Missouri Supreme Court had 
deemed it premature to set any execution during the pendency of discovery in a federal lethal 
injection challenge then active in the Western District of Missouri. Robert Patrick, Missouri 
execution dates postponed because of suit over new drug, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 15, 
2012, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/missouri-execution-dates-postponed-
because-of-suit-over-new-drug/article_9f82e200-e672-11e1-b3eb-0019bb30f31a.html [https://per 
ma.cc/YNG6-6ZCA]. On August 14, 2013, exactly one year after the court’s lethal injection stay 
and with discovery in the federal lethal injection litigation still pending, the Russell Court set 
execution dates for both Mr. Franklin and Mr. Nicklasson. Both men were executed before the end 
of the year. Sam Levin, Joseph Franklin, Serial Killer Who Shot Larry Flynt, Gets Execution Date 
in Missouri, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2013 
/08/15/joseph-franklin-serial-killer-who-shot-larry-flynt-gets-execution-date-in-missouri 
[https://perma.cc/JD3D-DB9W]. This ushered in the aforementioned period of executions wherein 
the supreme court entered show cause orders at a near monthly interval to capital prisoners who 
had concluded their federal habeas proceedings. Todd C. Frankel, Execution drug worked quickly, 
but debate persists on use, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 2013, at A1, A6. As set forth 
below, it later emerged that Mr. Christeson’s lawyers wrote him about his show cause order dated 
April 7, 2014. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 163-64, Christeson v. Roper, No. 04-08004 
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2017), ECF 175. Instead of giving him a sober assessment of his dire situation, 
they offered assurances that the court was merely carrying out an “administrative” piece of 
housekeeping. Id. 
 40. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2014) (No. 14-
6873). 
 41. Memorandum of Filing Proposed Budget, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW 
(W.D. Mo. May 14, 2004), ECF No. 8. 
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despite obtaining the funding from the court, the lawyers failed to pursue any 
mental or psychological testing.  
After meeting Mark, recruited counsel met with the appointed attorneys who 
had solicited their consultation. Recruited counsel explained that a review of 
appointed counsel’s file of their representation of Mr. Christeson would be 
critical in determining whether equitable tolling of the statute of limitations 
could be litigated. Many boxes from Mr. Christeson’s trial, direct appeal, and 
state post-conviction litigation, were arrayed in a conference room in the original 
lawyers’ offices. But not a single document within that room came from the 
federal counsel’s file pursuant to their 2004 appointment by the Western District 
of Missouri. After fruitless discussion about the need to assess their file and their 
actual conduct between their appointment and their late filing of Mark’s federal 
habeas petition, the meeting ended.  
The next day, on May 7, 2014, Mark’s appointed attorneys filed their 
response to the Missouri Supreme Court’s show cause order.42 Despite being 
made aware, repeatedly, that their conflict of interest against Mr. Christeson 
foreclosed any assertions about their own conduct and actions relating to their 
appointment, the lawyers made a self-interested portrayal of those very things.43 
In the very same pleading, the appointed attorneys explicitly recognized their 
own conflict, even as they manifested it.44 
Because the filing was adverse to Mr. Christeson, it created ethical 
obligations for counsel recruited to consult on this case. Ethics advice confirmed 
the need to alert the appointing court to the conflict of interest under which the 
2004-appointed attorneys labored. Recruited counsel thus filed a notifying 
pleading, as an interested party, apprising the federal court of the misconduct of 
the appointed attorneys during the critical stage in Mr. Christeson’s habeas case, 
when AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was running.45 The pleading 
explained that appointed counsel had abandoned their client prior to the 
expiration of the statutory time limit, and then, after the fact, attempted to hide 
that from the courts and from their client.46 The abandonment and subsequent 
cover up created an unwaivable conflict of interest. The filing set forth the need 
for the district court to appoint new unconflicted lawyers to review the case and 
 
 42. Appellant’s Response to Order to Show Cause at 1, State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251 
(Mo. 2001) (No. SC 82082). 
 43. Id. at 12–13. 
 44. Id. at 12; Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 894 (2015) (“The court’s principal error was 
its failure to acknowledge [counsel’s] conflict of interest. . . . Counsel cannot reasonably be 
expected to make such an argument, which threatens their professional reputation and livelihood.”). 
 45. Notice by Friends of the Court of Petitioner’s Need for Substitution by Conflict Free 
Counsel at 1–35, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. May 23, 2014), ECF 
62. 
 46. Id. at 3–8. 
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litigate on Mr. Christeson’s behalf.47 Pro bono counsel, acting as “friends of the 
court,” submitted their availability to accept appointment while insisting that 
Mr. Christeson, at bottom, needed qualified, conflict-free attorneys to address 
these grave matters for the district court.48  
In turn, the district court ordered the extant, conflicted lawyers, and the 
State, to respond to the pleading.49 That order precipitated the objection to 
requesting the conflicted lawyers to argue (yet again) against the interests of 
their current client. The district court ignored the objection and Mr. Christeson’s 
initial lawyers did exactly what was feared. In two separate filings, appointed 
counsel violated multiple ethical obligations to their client (including the 
attorney-client privilege) and continued to defend their conduct and actions, 
insisting that they had intentionally filed the petition 117 days after the actual 
deadline.50 Appointed counsel also argued that it would be a waste of court 
resources to appoint out-of-district counsel for Mr. Christeson.51 The district 
court ruled that new counsel was not needed.52  
While litigating the district court’s order in the Eighth Circuit, Missouri 
issued an execution warrant for Mr. Christeson, scheduling his execution for 
forty days later.53 The Eighth Circuit declined to grant a stay of execution and, 
days before the scheduled date of October 29, 2014 at 12:01 a.m. CDT, 
summarily affirmed the district court without an opinion.54 Pro bono counsel 
sought certiorari and a stay in the Supreme Court. Midday on October 28, 2014, 
Justice Alito entered a unique order for supplemental briefing on the question of 
whether Mr. Christeson had authorized pro bono counsel to represent him.55 
About ten hours after this simultaneous briefing by the State and pro bono 
counsel and about two hours before the appointed time for Mark’s execution, 
 
 47. Id. at 18–25. 
 48. Id. at 31–33. 
 49. Order for Written Response to Notice by Friends of the Court of Petitioner’s Need for 
Substitution by Conflict Free Counsel, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. 
May 27, 2014), ECF 63. 
 50. Response to Court Order for Written Response at 1, 5, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF 73; Response to Motion to Reconsider at 1–4, 
Christeson v. Roper No. 4:04-cv-08004-DW (W.D. Mo. June 20, 2014), ECF 75. 
 51. Response to Court Order for Written Response at 19, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF 73. 
 52. Order Denying Motion to Appoint Substitute Counsel, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. July 10, 2014), ECF 78. 
 53. Warrant of Execution, State v. Christeson, No. SC82082 (Mo. banc. Sept. 19, 2014). 
 54. Judgment Denying Motion for Stay of Execution, Christeson v. Roper, No. 14–3889 (8th 
Cir. 2014). 
 55. Order for Supplemental Briefs, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015) (No. 14–6873) 
(directing the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether Mark had authorized Phillips 
Black attorneys to move on his behalf). 
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the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the execution.56 Three months later, the Court 
entered a per curiam opinion summarily reversing the Eighth Circuit, by a seven 
to two vote and remanding the case for appointment of conflict free counsel.57 
The Court held that the “appointed attorneys—who had missed the filing 
deadline—could not be expected to argue that Christeson was entitled to the 
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.”58 As the Supreme Court 
explained, 
Christeson’s only hope for securing review of the merits of his habeas claims 
was to file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking to 
reopen final judgment on the ground that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should 
have been equitably tolled. But [original counsel] could not be expected to file 
such a motion on Christeson’s behalf, as any argument for equitable tolling 
would be premised on their own malfeasance in failing to file timely the habeas 
petition.59 
As the Court observed, that malfeasance had led one renowned ethical expert to 
opine: “if this was not abandonment, I am not sure what would be.”60  
Two months later, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court, 
which terminated the appointment of the attorneys appointed nearly eleven years 
prior and appointed formerly pro bono counsel to serve under 18 U.S.C. § 3599 
as the conflict-free counsel to which the Supreme Court had adjudged Mr. 
Christeson was entitled.61 Pursuant to this order, new counsel prepared a budget 
requesting funds to cover the necessary investigation and expert assistance.62  
Two things had to be established for the courts to reopen Mr. Christeson’s 
federal habeas application. First, as the Supreme Court had observed, pursuant 
to Holland v. Florida, “[t]olling based on counsel’s failure to satisfy AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations is available only for ‘serious instances of attorney 
misconduct.’”63 Second, Holland required that the petitioner, in the normal 
course, had to establish that he, individually, had been reasonably diligent in 
protecting his rights, despite being confined in prison.64 This is a fact-bound 
inquiry and would require investigation into the capacity for diligence of Mr. 
 
 56. Stay of Execution, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015) (No. 14–6837). 
 57. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 896 (2015) (per curiam). 
 58. Id. at 892. 
 59. Id. at 892–93. 
 60. Id. at 892. 
 61. Order Granting Substitution of Counsel at 1, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–
DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2015), ECF 110. 
 62. This budget proposal was filed ex parte and under seal. Order Granting Motion to File 
Budget Under Seal, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2015), ECF 
121. 
 63. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 891 (2015) (per curiam) (citing Holland v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 631, 652 (2010)). 
 64. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. 
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Christeson, who, the Supreme Court had observed “appears to have severe 
cognitive disabilities that lead him to rely entirely on his attorneys, [and] may 
not have been aware of [his petition’s] dismissal.”65 The Court suggested, for 
the first time since its 2010 ruling in Holland, that the given petitioner’s 
individual impairments or lack of capacity to overcome the circumstances of his 
attorneys’ misconduct could warrant equitable tolling.66 
In addition to Mark’s low IQ score and his special education records, there 
existed other evidence of impaired cognition and potential brain injury. Multiple 
prisoners described Mark as “slow” and “childlike” in his thinking. Mark 
suffered from absence seizures that caused him essentially to lose consciousness 
for moments at a time. Because of his youth, the details of his crime involving a 
mother and children, and his own status as a victim of child sexual exploitation, 
he was immediately sexually preyed upon when he entered the maximum-
security prison. In addition to unrelenting sexual assault and trauma in prison, 
he was beaten nearly to death in 2000 by two prisoners, whose letter bragging 
about what they had done bizarrely was published by their local newspaper as a 
sort of celebration of rough justice.67 All of these factors severely impacted 
Mark’s capacity to diligently assert his rights in 2004-2005 and undermined his 
ability to question his attorneys when they assured him that everything was fine. 
Correspondence reflects that even as the Missouri Supreme Court issued a show 
cause order moving toward issuing an execution warrant, the lawyers wrote to 
Mark that it “does not mean that an execution date will be set in your case 
anytime in the near future. . . . It appears that the State of Missouri [sic] is doing 
nothing more than administratively reviewing all of the capital cases pending in 
the state.”68 As they wrote this, another client of theirs, William Rousan, was set 
to be executed just eight days later,69 following the issuance in his case of the 
same show cause order Mr. Christeson had just received.70 Mr. Rousan was, in 
fact, executed on April 23, 2014, as scheduled. 
The district court denied the funding request submitted upon the case’s 
remand.71 Instead, it approved a mere fraction of the substantiated budget (about 
1/16 of the amount)72 and, without reason, deprived counsel of the capacity to 
 
 65. Christeson, 135 S. Ct. at 892. 
 66. Id. 
 67. The Associated Press, Inmates Publicize Retribution Attack on Children’s Killer, SE. 
MISSOURIAN, Apr. 18, 2001, at 4A; Editorial, Prison Justice Takes a Pretty Nasty Turn, SE. 
MISSOURIAN, Apr. 24, 2001, at B6. 
 68. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2014) (No. 14–
6873). 
 69. Execution Judgment, Rousan v. Lombardi, No. 14–01919 (8th Cir. Apr. 28, 2014). 
 70. Show Cause Order 79566, Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d (Mo. banc Jan. 29, 2014). 
 71. Order Denying Budget at 2, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. 
Apr. 29, 2015), ECF 122. 
 72. Id. at 1–2. 
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hire experts and conduct the requisite investigation. Subsequent filings proffered 
preliminary expert reports showing that serious red flags existed, and that follow 
up and full evaluations and assessments were necessary.73 The experts analyzed 
testing data revealing that Mark was in the lowest brackets for memory, recall, 
language, and expression.74 They opined that the impairments were a 
combination of organic brain dysfunction and the neurobiologic impact of life 
long trauma.75  
Mark’s capacity made him particularly vulnerable to the fraud perpetrated 
by his prior counsel. Prior counsel could not provide a single shred of evidence 
to suggest that they had undertaken any work on his behalf during the statutorily 
relevant, 334-day time period.76 They could not produce a single piece of work 
product, nor a memo, note, time entry, bill, email, letter, or even a post-it created 
during that time. They never interviewed a single witness or expert. They had 
not met with or emailed resource counsel. They had absolutely no contact with 
Mr. Christeson during that time. Their complete absence of a file was proof, ipso 
facto, of their abandonment.77 As legal expert Prof. Lawrence Fox observed, “no 
lawyer[ ] could handle a habeas case without taking notes, writing reviews of 
documents, preparing questions in advance of conducting depositions, 
researching and outlining legal arguments, summarizing case law, printing out 
key cases, and producing research memoranda.”78  
The district court denied the petition without holding a hearing.79 Though 
the state provided no evidence – or even argument—about the attorneys’ action 
during the relevant time, the court nonetheless found that there was not 
abandonment.80  
The required application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 followed, asking permission to appeal the injustice.81 This 
type of permission is routinely denied by federal courts, even in capital cases.82 
 
 73. Rule 60(b) Motion at 37–41, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. 
Aug. 28, 2015), ECF 125. 
 74. Id. at 39. 
 75. Id. at 34–45. 
 76. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 133-145, Christeson v. Roper, No. 04–08004 
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2017), ECF 145. 
 77. Appellants Addendum to Brief Supplemental Report of Lawrence J. Fox at 4–6, 
Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Jan. 24, 2017). 
 78. Id. at 5. 
 79. Order Denying Rule 60(b)(6) Motion at 21, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW 
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2016), ECF 150. 
 80. Id. at 16. 
 81. Application for Certificate of Appealability at 10–103, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 
(8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2016). 
 82. See, e.g., Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 1312 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]n a capital case…the 
severity of the penalty does not in itself suffice to warrant the automatic issuing of a certificate.”) 
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983)). 
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Thus, several organizations filed amicus petitions in support: The American Bar 
Association, represented by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, and Flom; a group 
of former judges, represented by Goldstein & Russell; and three national defense 
associations: the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, National 
Legal Aid and Defender Association, and National Association of Public 
Defenders, represented by the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center 
in St. Louis Missouri.83 The Amici argued that the district court’s denial of 
funding represented a dangerous precedent – for Mr. Christeson as well as other 
indigent capital defendants – and part of a troubling pattern in certain states 
around the country undermining the access to justice and the rule of law.84 
Three months later, on October 12, 2016, with the COA request still 
pending, the Missouri Supreme Court set another execution date for Mr. 
Christeson.85 This was an unprecedented measure. The state’s high court had not 
previously ordered an execution date before litigation under the federal habeas 
corpus statute had run its course in the federal courts.86 The Eighth Circuit 
continued to entertain the request for two more months, until December 12, 
when it granted permission to appeal on four separate issues, and set a briefing 
schedule that extended six weeks beyond Missouri’s scheduled execution date.87 
Nine days later, however, on motion of the State, the court expedited its 
schedule, condensing the two-month process into three weeks, thereby 
 
 83. Brief of Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Christeson v. Griffith, 
No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2016); Brief of Former Federal and State Judges as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Christeson v. Roper, No. 16-2730 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2016); Brief for 
Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Christeson v. Roper, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016). 
 84. See, e.g., Brief for Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, et al. In Support of 
Petitioner at 1, 31-32, Christeson, No. 16–2730. 
 85. Warrant of Execution, State v. Christeson, No. SC82082 (Mo. banc. Oct. 12, 2016). 
 86. Further, in Mr. Christeson’s case, the U.S. Supreme Court had stayed his 2014 execution 
date and ultimately remanded the case to the lower federal courts, thereby triggering a Missouri 
Supreme Court rule providing for the exhaustion of the right to relief before the setting of a new 
date. MO. SUP. CT. R. 30.30(c) (“If an execution is stayed, the Court shall set a new date of 
execution upon motion of the state or upon its own motion. No such motion shall be considered 
prior to exhaustion of the defendant’s right to seek relief in the Supreme Court of the United States 
following review of the defendant’s direct appeal, state post-conviction motion, and federal habeas 
corpus decision unless the defendant fails to pursue such remedy.”) Since this precedent in 
Christeson, the Missouri Supreme Court entered an execution date for Mr. Russell Bucklew on 
November 21, 2017 despite ongoing federal court action pursuant to a U.S. Supreme Court stay of 
execution. See Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 2015). Mr. Bucklew received 
another stay of execution from the U.S. Supreme Court on the day of his scheduled execution. 
Bucklew v. Precythe, 17–3052, March 20, 2018. 
 87. Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. 
Dec. 13, 2016). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
842 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 62:825 
compressing the timetable to conclude briefing before the execution date 
imposed by the state court two months prior.88  
The crux of the argument on appeal was that the district court needed, at the 
very least, to hold a hearing on the issue of abandonment. That court’s factual 
finding that the attorneys had not abandoned Mark was not only unsupported by 
the evidence, it was actually contrary to the only evidence in the record and the 
determinations made by the U.S. Supreme Court in this very case. Apparently 
recognizing the efficacy of the COA application, and perhaps to protect itself 
from another reversal, the Court of Appeals interrupted its accelerated briefing 
schedule and, in a bizarre turn of events, granted the defense’s longstanding 
request for an evidentiary hearing, remanding for that limited purpose while 
expressly retaining jurisdiction over the appeal.89 Briefly, it appeared that the 
circuit court was contemplating meaningful process. But less than 120 minutes 
later, before it had received the mandate or even electronic notice of the appellate 
court’s order, the district court took the extraordinary step of ordering an 
evidentiary hearing to occur less than 48 hours later.90 By the following 
morning, before court opened, discovery motions were filed seeking the 
requisite, targeted production for a meaningful hearing, specifically requesting 
copies of the lawyers’ calendars, billing records, telephone records, as well as 
the identity of their former paralegals or assistants in order to prove that they 
had not been working on the case during the time in question.91 The district court 
denied the motions and denied a continuance, giving no credence to the 
problems resulting from allotting only forty-one hours’ notice of the hearing and 
 
 88. Order Granting Expedited Appeal, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730, (8th Cir. Dec. 22, 
2016). 
 89. Christeson v. Griffith, 845 F.3d 1239, 1240 (8th Cir. 2017), as amended (Feb. 6, 2017). 
 90. Order Granting Evidentiary Hearing, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW 
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 18, 2017), ECF 160. 
 91. Motion for Discovery at 8-9, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. 
Jan. 19, 2017), ECF 165. Had the district court granted discovery, a stay of execution would almost 
certainly have been necessary. In considering the district court’s denial of the motion, it must be 
noted that the “good cause” standard for obtaining discovery under Rule 6(a) of the “Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts” is lower than, and subsumed 
within, the standard to obtain an evidentiary hearing, as a habeas petitioner may be entitled to Rule 
6 discovery before he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Rules Covering § 2254 cases, 28 
U.S.C.A. foll. §2254 R. 6(a) (2010); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80–83 (1977) (noting the 
district court’s power to conduct discovery under Rule 6 and that petitioners are “entitled to careful 
consideration and plenary processing of [claims], including full opportunity for presentation of the 
relevant facts,” but declining to order an evidentiary hearing) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 
286, 298 (1969)); accord East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1000–002 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding a state 
habeas petitioner “has shown good cause for discovery under Rule 6” although the Court “need not 
. . . decide whether [petitioner] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing,” noting that a “hearing is 
required . . . only if the record reveals a genuine question of fact” and “[a]llegations that are facially 
sufficient to entitle a petitioner to discovery under Rule 6 might not entitle a petitioner to an 
evidentiary hearing”). 
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impeding the ability of Mr. Christeson’s counsel, let alone witnesses, to 
physically attend the hearing.92  
Mark’s prior lawyers, however, wasted no time getting to the court. The 
Attorney General’s Office immediately called them (ex parte) and instructed 
them to travel across the state from St. Louis. Eleven days before the execution 
date, without even receiving service of a subpoena as their enduring duty to Mr. 
Christeson would require—at a minimum—before they could give testimony 
adverse to their former client, they got in their cars and traversed the state for 
five hours to get to Kansas City to testify. These men had taken eleven months 
to meet their client for the first time but managed to set aside everything else 
instantly in order to testify against him in proceedings days before his execution 
date.  
On the stand the lawyers swore up and down that they had not abandoned 
their client, but that they had intentionally calculated the date by rejecting the 
stated law of the jurisdiction—law explicitly invoked in their own motion seeking 
appointment in this case—and using a conflicting interpretation from a wholly 
different federal circuit.93 They conceded that they had failed to meet him for 
329 days after appearing in the case.94 They unequivocally defended their total 
lack of a file: they swore that in preparing a federal habeas petition for a capital 
petitioner they did not take a single written note—not even a post-it note—and 
thus had nothing to produce.95 They both testified that they met only in person 
and thus generated not a single email during their representation of Mr. 
Christeson.96 They testified that they conducted research only in books and 
physically at a law library, thus never producing an electronic record from any 
service such as Westlaw, Lexis, or Pacer.97 Despite having drafted and filed a 
budget (and repeatedly calling the clerk to check its status), they never kept a 
time entry for their activities.98 They testified that they never intended to bill 
because they never billed in any capital cases.99 Efforts on cross-examination to 
impeach them with documentary proof of their bills (public records available 
from the district court’s own dockets) were prevented by counsel for the State’s 
objections, which the district judge sustained.100 All told, the judge sustained all 
 
 92. Order Denying Motion to Reschedule Evidentiary Hearing, Christeson v. Roper, No. 
4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2017), ECF 167. 
 93. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 23–24, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–
DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2017), ECF 175. 
 94. Id. at 79–80. 
 95. Id. at 55–58, 151. 
 96. Id. at 85. 
 97. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 55–56, Christeson, No. 04-08004. 
 98. Id. at 59. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 87. 
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of the Assistant Attorney General’s objections and denied all ten of Mr. 
Christeson’s counsel during this hearing.101  
In sum, the testifying lawyers asked the court to simply take their word. 
After the five-hour hearing, the judge took a brief recess and returned to the 
bench in order to do just that. The court read fact-findings into the record, finding 
credible all of the foregoing positions asserted by the testifying lawyers.102  
When the case returned to the federal appeals court in St. Louis, one judge 
openly acknowledged that the lawyers’ defense, if true, would still amount to 
“deficient” performance, but that, because they “allegedly conducted some legal 
research, cursory as it may have been” it did not amount to serious 
misconduct.103 Thus, the lawyers’ excuse was sufficient to eliminate the 
development and presentation of all of Mr. Christeson’s possible legal claims, 
thereby sending him to his death with no federal review of any violations of the 
Constitution. With that, the Circuit Court of Appeals, which had kept the case 
pending for seven months prior, issued a short denial seven days after the hastily 
ordered hearing, on the Friday afternoon before the Tuesday execution date.104 
This left next to no time to present the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court had intervened once in this case, but it would not step 
in a second time, manifesting a resistance to exercising its inherent supervisory 
powers.105 Only Justice Ginsburg dissented from the denial of the stay 
application, singularly expressing her disquiet with the lower courts’ treatment 
of the case since its remand two years prior.106  
V.  EPILOGUE 
January 31, 2017, 5:37 p.m. CST: The Supreme Court denies Mark 
Christeson’s final legal action and application to stay his execution.107 Minutes 
later, the governor’s office issued its statement denying clemency.108 It is now 
6:40 p.m., and the prison has cut Mark’s phone line, leaving his lawyers stunned 
and frantically calling the prison. The correctional officers will come and escort 
Mark to his gurney. There, a Department of Corrections Official will read his 
 
 101. Id. at 25–134. 
 102. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 176–79, Christeson, No. 04–08004. 
 103. Christeson v. Griffith, 860 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2017) (Murphy, J., Concurring) (“Here, 
counsel allegedly conducted some legal research, cursory as it may have been. Minimal or mistaken 
legal research does not equate to serious attorney misconduct, however.”) 
 104. Id. at 590. 
 105. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari”). 
 106. Christeson v. Griffith, 137 S. Ct. 910, 910 (2017). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Jim Salter, Missouri executes Mark Christeson for 1998 murders of mother and two 
children, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-
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6f54-5496-941b-9fbeac1d553e.html [https://perma.cc/PXF3-C4JU]. 
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final words: “let my family know I love them with all my heart and I’m more 
than blessed to have them in my life. . .and thank God for such an amazing 
family.”109 At 6:57 p.m. the Missouri Department of Corrections will begin the 
lethal injection protocol. At 7:05 p.m. he will be pronounced dead. 
By virtually any measure, Mark’s family had failed him. His life before 
prison presaged his life within prison. He was prey, relentlessly exploited and 
violated. Yet he was much more than a mere victim. Mark succeeded in seeing 
the love that his troubled family had shown him in the years leading up to his 
death. For their part, they saw beyond this crime and embraced the human being 
Mark was, a man capable of love and generosity of spirit, a person of great 
kindness and warmth. So too should our system of laws and the officers of its 
courts have fully considered the human dignity of Mr. Christeson and the totality 
of circumstances concerned in his case. But that simply did not happen. 
In 1998, the same year of the crime for which Mark was condemned, Judge 
Blackmar wrote about another deeply troubled life: “The easiest course of action 
might be to execute him as a means of extermination or euthanasia, but there 
should be a limit to the process of burying our mistakes. The state must bear 
some responsibility for the situation which has developed.”110 So too, we bear 
responsibility for the tragic crime and death of Mark Christeson, who spent half 
of his life in a maximum-security prison before, just shy of his thirty-seventh 
birthday, he met his executioner.  
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